October is filled with tall tales and horror stories to keep us on the edge of our seats ahead of Halloween, but it’s all fun-and-games so long as the stories are fictional. In honor of National Fire Prevention Month, we bring you this true story; one of the most memorable horror stories in the theatre world, in fact, is that of real panic, real terror, and real death: the Iroquois Theatre fire in Chicago, Illinois.
With more that 600 casualties and 250 non-fatal injuries, this famed fire was a horrific incident that still resonates to this day, and helped shape some of the strict regulations placed specifically upon theatres to help prevent accidents like this from repeating.
The event occurred on Wednesday, December 30th when the Iroquois presented a matinee performance of the popular Drury Lane musical Mr. Blue Beard, which had been playing at the Iroquois since opening night. Tickets were sold for every seat in the house, plus hundreds more for the "standing room" areas at the back of the theater. Many of the estimated 2,100–2,200 patrons attending the matinee were children. The standing room areas were so crowded that some patrons instead sat in the aisles, blocking the exits.
At about 3:15 that afternoon, shortly after the beginning of the second act, eight men and eight women were performing In the Pale Moonlight. Sparks from an arc light ignited a muslin curtain, likely the result of an electrical short circuit. A stagehand tried to douse the fire with the Kilfyre canisters provided, but it quickly spread to the fly gallery high above the stage. There, several thousand square feet of highly flammable painted canvas scenery flats were hung. The stage manager tried to lower the asbestos fire curtain, but it snagged. Early reports state that it was stopped by the trolley-wire that carried one of the acrobats over the stage but later investigation showed that the curtain had been blocked by a light reflector which stuck out under the proscenium arch. A chemist who later tested part of the curtain stated that it was mainly wood pulp mixed with asbestos, and would have been "of no value in a fire”.
By this time, many of the patrons on all levels were quickly attempting to flee the theater. Some had found the fire exits hidden behind draperies on the north side of the building, but found that they could not open the unfamiliar bascule locks. Some patrons panicked, crushing or trampling others in a desperate attempt to escape from the fire. Many were killed while trapped in dead ends or while trying to open what looked like doors with windows in them but were actually only windows.
The dancers on stage were also forced to flee, along with the performers backstage and in the numerous dressing rooms. Several performers and stagehands facilitated themselves an escape through the building's main rear exit, which consisted of an unusually large set of stock double doors that would have normally served the purpose of moving large fly sceneries and set pieces or props into the backstage area of the theater. When this was opened an icy wind blast rushed inside fueling the flames with unspent oxygen and making the fire substantially larger. Many escaped from the burning theater through the coal hatch and through windows in the dressing rooms, and others tried to escape via the west stage door, which opened inwards and became jammed as actors pressed toward the door frantically trying to get out.
By chance a passing railroad agent saw the crowd pressing against the door and unfastened the hinges from the outside using tools that he normally carried with him, allowing the actors and stagehands to escape. Someone else opened the massive double freight doors in the north wall, normally used for scenery, allowing "a cyclonic blast" of cold air to rush into the building and create an enormous fireball. As the vents above the stage were nailed or wired shut, the fireball instead traveled outwards, ducking under the stuck asbestos curtain and streaking toward the vents behind the dress circle and gallery 50 feet away.
The hot gases and flames passed over the heads of those in the orchestra seats and incinerated everything flammable in the gallery and dress circle levels, including patrons still trapped in those areas. The largest death toll was at the base of the stairways, where hundreds of people were trampled, crushed, or asphyxiated.
The Iroquois had no fire alarm box or telephone. The Chicago Fire Department's Engine 13 was alerted to the fire by a stagehand who had been ordered to run from the burning theater to the nearest firehouse. On the way to the scene, at approximately 3:33 pm, a member of Engine 13 activated an alarm box to call additional units. Initial efforts focused on the people trapped on icy, unfinished fire escapes. The alley to the north of the theater, known as Couch Place, was also icy, narrow, and full of smoke. Aerial ladders could not be used in the alley and black nets, concealed by the smoke, proved useless.
The Chicago Police Department became involved when an officer patrolling the theater district saw people emerge from the building in a panic, some with clothing on fire. He called in from a police box on Randolph Street, and police, summoned by whistles, soon converged on the scene to control traffic and aid with the evacuation. Some of the city's 30 uniformed police matrons were called in, because of the number of female casualties.
Fire is unfortunately a common hazard in theatre, and history is riddled with examples just like this one. Many municipalities now have laws on the books regarding fire prevention specifically in theatres. We at StageSpot take safety very seriously, and carry a variety of products to help with your safety plan ahead of your winter productions.
No single fire retardant can effectively handle all the materials used in modern stagecraft, but Rosco manufactures a range of products called Flamex that offer a solution for the most common materials.
The wide variety of scenic materials that make up a theatrical production can make fire safety compliance seem difficult. Adding to this challenge is the fact that regulations vary from state to state, and in some cases, city to city. It is important to realize that ultimately your local Fire Marshall has total jurisdiction and discretion. Consult with your local fire department for more details.
Though Rosco Flamex Fire Retardants do not prevent a material from igniting and burning., they do retard ignition and slow the spread of fire. Rosco Flamex works in two ways to achieve this: lowering the ignition temperature of the treated material and retarding the production of flame. When burned, materials treated with Flamex produce inert gases, which starve the fire of oxygen and also develop a non-combustible char. Properly flame treated fabrics may ignite, but will self-extinguish within a few seconds after the flame has been withdrawn.
Check out our handy guide below.
The chemicals used in Rosco Flamex can only be effective when applied properly, and in sufficient quantities. However, the effectiveness of the treatment is not directly proportional to the amount of chemical added on to the material. Below a critical add-on level, there is little or no flame retardant achieved. Adequate treatment requires an application of sufficient Rosco Flamex to increase the fully dried weight of the sample by 10-20%. While 10-20% is a typical add-on, the amount required for good flame retardation will vary with the composition of the material being treated. Always treat and test a sample first!
Rosco Flamex is water-soluble and can be easily removed by laundering and exposure to water. However, the flame retardant is not soluble in most dry cleaning solvents and the safety of treated fabrics will not be altered by dry cleaning, if the solvent is free of moisture and other detergents.
Remember: always retest your fabrics after dry cleaning to ensure compliance.
If you’re unsure about what exactly you need to make sure you’re covered in the event of a fire, give us a call and we can recommend the right coatings for preventative measures.
